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ABSTRACT  
EMILY KATHERINE MCKEE: The Effects of Terrorism on Public Opinion 
of Gun Control in the United States 
(Under the direction of Matthew DiGiuseppe) 
 The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between 
terrorist activity and public support for gun control. This thesis tests three 
hypotheses: 1) that out-group violence causes greater support for gun control 
than in-group violence, 2) that the method of violence determines support 
for gun control, and 3) that the results of the first two hypotheses are 
dependent on the conditional variables of gender, fear of Muslims, and 
residence in an urban or rural area. To analyze these relationships, a survey 
experiment was conducted to determine if out-group violence and method of 
violence had an affect on public support for gun control. The results of this 
study showed no significant increased support for gun control when violence 
was perpetrated by an out-group member, and the method of violence also 
appeared to have no affect in the general population. However, when these 
relationships were analyzed across conditional variables, certain 
characteristics, especially gender, had an affect of gun policy opinions and 
other security preferences. This study concludes that although no 
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generalizable results were found in this analysis, there is much room for 
greater exploration of the topic along other conditional variables.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 What impact does terrorist activity involving guns have on public 
support for gun control? Researchers have extensively studied terrorism and 
opinion on gun control independently, but little research has yet been done 
that analyzes the relationship between the two. However, since terrorists are 
increasingly using guns to perpetrate their attacks in the United States, it is 
imperative that this potential relationship be explored (Do people associate 
guns, Miller 2015). Even though terrorism accounts for only a small 
percentage of deaths per year in the United States, from 2002 to 2014, 85% 
of people killed in the United States by terrorists were killed through the use 
of a firearm (Do people associate guns). 
 While there is little research on terrorists and their affect on gun 
control, the idea of racial and out-group differences affecting opinion on gun 
control is not a new one. Throughout the numerous racial divides in the 
history of the United States, the increased use of guns and gun violence 
during the Civil Rights Era produced a change in public opinion about gun 
control unlike any other point in American history. The use and advocacy of 
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guns by a Black Power group called the Black Panthers increased public 
support for gun control to an extent hard to match by any other group.   
 The Black Panthers were one of the main groups advocating the Black 
Power movement in the Civil Rights Era. They strongly advocated the right 
to bear loaded weapons in public at a time when the rest of the country was 
growing in support for gun control in response to the increased violence 
during the Civil Rights Movement (Winkler 2011). Guns were central to the 
Panther’s identity and political philosophy, and they taught their young 
recruits that guns were essential to their freedom and liberty as citizens 
(Winkler 2011).  
 The Panthers’ display of loaded weapons in public led conservative 
politicians in California to propose laws that would ban carrying loaded guns 
in public (Winkler 2011). When the leaders of the Panthers heard of these 
policy proposals, they led their activists to the California Capitol building 
with loaded weapons in hand to demonstrate their opposition (Winkler 
2011).  
 However, this protest provoked backlash. Lawmakers sped the 
passage of the gun restriction proposals and made them even more strict. 
The fear inspired by black people with guns also led the US Congress to 
consider additional gun control legislation (Winkler 2011). More laws were 
passed that greatly expanded the federal licensing system for gun dealers and 
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clarified who could and could not own firearms (Winkler 2011). Critics of 
the legislation said the laws were passed not to control guns, but were passed 
to control blacks (Winkler 2011). 
 In light of public attitude toward blacks in the post Civil Rights Era in 
their relation to and stereotypical use of guns, their story is significant 
because it is plausible that these same attitudes could be applied to Muslim 
terrorists (Do people associate guns). Similar to how the increased use of 
guns by blacks in the Civil Rights Era led to increased support for gun 
control in the 1960s, the situation today of an out-group, specifically 
terrorists, increasing their use of guns could again lead to increased support 
for gun control. In the case of the Black Panthers, out-group use of guns and 
fear of the out-group led to an increased support for restrictionist policies 
and an increased willingness to give up civil liberties — specifically a 
willingness to give up gun rights. The same public response can be expected 
today in response to terrorist activity utilizing guns. Out-group use of guns 
and fear of that out-group, specifically terrorists, should lead to increased 
public support for gun restrictions.  
 In this paper, I seek to help improve the understanding of the effects 
of terrorism and method of terrorism on public opinion of gun control. 
Specifically, I intend to analyze if violence perpetrated by an out-group 
member increases public support for gun control and if that support is 
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additionally affected by the method of violence a perpetrator utilizes. To do 
this, I conduct a survey experiment to test if exposure to out-group violence, 
specifically terrorist activity using a gun, increases support for gun control. 
 In general, this study found no significant, generalizable evidence that 
terrorist or out-group violence increases support for gun control more than 
in-group violence, and there was also no significant evidence found that the 
method of violence has an effect on the level of support for increased 
restrictions. However, some results showed that there were such different 
levels of support based along different demographic variables, such as 
gender. There were also some interesting findings in that when there were 
significant levels of support, it was often in-group member violence as 
opposed to out-group member violence that spurred such support. 
Additionally, security measures that were unrelated to gun control, such as 
the use of metal detectors, were more likely to receive increased support 
than gun restriction policies. The results of this study highlight that opinion 
on gun control is highly divisive and not easily changed, and it leaves many 
open pathways for future research to build upon the theory based upon other 
conditional variables (Smith 1980).  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Public Opinion and Gun Control  
 In order to be able to determine the significance of terrorist activity on 
gun control, it is first important to understand what current public opinion is 
on gun policy in the United States. Many studies and surveys have been 
conducted to determine public opinion about guns, however, there has been 
little research done to determine how terrorist activity involving guns plays a 
part in shaping public opinion on gun policy.  
 Unsurprisingly, there are strong partisan, demographic, and 
ideological divides on gun policy and ownership in the United States 
(Doherty et al. 2016). Table 1, derived from information provided by the 
Pew Research Center, gives an overview of these differences. While the 
majority of both the Republican and Democratic parties support background 
checks for private gun sales and barring people on federal watch lists from 
purchasing guns, there is a much greater partisan divide regarding proposals 
of banning assault style weapons, with Republicans being much less likely 
to support such a ban (Doherty et al. 2016). Such different opinions on gun 
policy and ownership are also reflected in certain demographic groups, with 
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Table 1   Broad support for gun control proposals among those in gun-owning households 
% who favor each policy proposal 
Federal database 
of gun sales
Background 
checks for gun 
shows
Barring gun buys 
by people on no-
fly lists
Laws to prevent 
mentally ill from 
buying guns 
% % % %
Total 68 81 71 76
Men 61 78 71 79
Women 74 84 70 73
White 64 84 76 83
Black 81 78 64 75
Hispanic 76 72 53 54
18-29 73 81 67 77
30-49 67 83 72 73
50-64 67 81 73 80
65+ 65 79 70 77
College grad+ 69 88 80 86
Some college 67 84 72 79
HS or less 65 79 70 77
Republican/Lean 
Rep
50 78 69 79
Democrat/Lean 
Dem 
82 86 74 77
Gun in household 58 83 73 82
No gun in 
household
79 83 70 73
Source: Doherty, Carroll, Jocelyn Kiley, and Rachel Weisel. “Opinions on gun policy and the 
2016 campaign.” Pew Research Center (August 26, 2016). http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/5/2016/08/08-26-16-Gun-policy-release.pdf
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women, blacks, and college graduates being more likely to support such 
restrictions and bans (Doherty et al. 2016, Smith 1980). Rural areas are more 
opposed to regulation than urban areas, and community regional location 
also affects level of opposition, with the Northeast being less opposed than 
the South or Midwest (Smith 1980). There are also differences in opinion 
among different religions, with Protestants being more opposed to regulation 
than Catholics or Jews (Smith 1980). Fear, gun ownership, and community 
type characteristics all affect opinion in that greater fear leads to higher 
support for regulation, gun ownership leads to higher opposition to 
regulation, and community type characteristics affect both fear and gun 
ownership (Smith 1980).  Such demographic factors relate to gun control 
attitudes because they stem in large part from different cultural heritages and 
past experiences (Smith 1980). Ideological divides in the United States are 
based around groups’ opinions of the purpose of guns - whether they think 
they do more to help society or harm it. While the majority of Americans 
believe gun ownership does more to protect the public than put safety at risk, 
two groups - adults with postgraduate degrees and Democrats/Independents - 
are more likely to believe gun ownership does more to put safety at risk 
(Doherty et al. 2016). 
 Despite the trends in opinion on gun policy that are evidenced in the 
United States today, the consensus for gun control generally has changed 
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over time. Even in the midst of numerous and highly publicized mass 
shootings, the country is at a time where the public is less willing to restrict 
gun ownership (Shootings 2015). For the first time in two decades, more 
Americans believe that guns do more to protect society than to harm it 
(Doherty et al. 2016, Doherty 2015). Because of this, more Americans 
support legislation that protects gun ownership rather than legislation that 
controls ownership, despite highly publicized shootings such as those at 
Orlando and Sandy Hook (Doherty 2015). In fact, in the year following the 
shooting at Sandy Hook, more legislation was passed that actually loosened 
restrictions on guns (Desilver 2013). While it is generally believed that 
support for gun control increases after such shootings, most instances show 
that support for stricter legislation increases slightly for only a short period 
of time, but continues to decline not long afterward (Doherty 2015). 
 One reason for this decreased support for gun control could be that 
many Americans have also declined in their belief of the effectiveness of 
gun control legislation to actually do anything to prevent gun violence and 
mass shootings such as Sandy Hook (Shootings 2015). After Sandy Hook, 
up to two-thirds of the public believed the shooting would have happened 
regardless of the gun control measures that could have been taken 
(Shootings 2015). 
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 Another reason for this decreased support for gun control could be 
based in how society views the act of violence. If a shooting as viewed as a 
societal problem, it is much more likely to garner public support for more 
regulation than a shooting that is viewed as an isolated act of violence 
(Drake 2013). In the past, the majority believed such occurrences were 
viewed as problems of society. Today, many believe the incidents to be 
isolated acts, which decreases support for gun control (Shootings 2015). 
This difference in how the public views the problem underlying the shooting 
could potentially be paralleled to terrorist activity - public opinion in favor 
for gun control after an act of terror may increase if the public views the 
attack as a societal issue, but may not increase if the attack appears to be 
isolated. 
 Another reason for this decline in support for gun control may be due 
to public misperceptions about what gun regulation measures actually exist 
(Aronow & Miller 2016). Some researchers suggest that the majority of the 
public actually supports strong gun regulations, such as universal 
background checks and either banning or stricter regulation of assault 
weapons. However, they argue that the majority of the public believe that 
such regulations already exist, and therefore do not support “new” 
legislation that would include them, hence the decline in support for gun 
control (Aronow & Miller 2016). This suggests that if the public were better 
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educated on current gun legislation, there would be an increase in support, or 
the opposite of what is currently evidenced.  
 Still, others believe and recognize that there is push from a large 
portion of the public to increase regulation of gun control and increase 
restrictions, such as implementing universal background checks. However, 
many have noticed that there is a gap between what a considerable portion of 
the public favors and what Congress delivers. This gap was long attributed 
to the intense feelings of gun regulation opponents blocking any efforts of 
such legislation to go through Congress. However, it is actually gun 
regulation supporters that were found to have the most intense feelings 
regarding gun policy, but that such intense feeling doesn’t necessarily 
correlate to action (Schuman, Howard, & Presser 1977; Schuman, Howard, 
& Presser 1981). Gun regulation opponents are more likely to participate 
and take action in supporting their position in some way than proponents are, 
showing that the feeling of intensity in regard to gun policy and taking 
action are more related for regulation opponents (Schuman, Howard, & 
Presser 1977; Schuman, Howard, & Presser 1981). 
 While no research has been done about terrorist activity affecting gun 
control opinions directly, the shooting in Orlando, Florida, sparked more 
interest in this area. After the shooting, the majority of Americans believed 
requiring background checks would help combat terrorism and a little over 
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half believed making it harder to buy assault weapons would have the same 
effect (Newport 2016). However, gun control and violence do not appear 
high on the majority of Americans’ lists of concerns, while combatting 
terrorism is high on the list (Newport 2016). This could show that there is a 
disconnect in peoples’ perceptions of terrorists and gun violence - possibly 
showing that people don’t associate terrorism with guns since they see one 
as a major concern and not the other.  
 It is safe to conclude that while some proposals of regulation, such as 
requiring background checks for all gun sales, are more widely supported, 
others, such as banning automatic weapons, are highly divisive along 
partisan, demographic, and ideological lines. It is also safe to generalize that 
public support for regulation is declining due to decreased belief that they 
will be effective coupled with a shift of the majority believing such 
shootings to be isolated acts despite an increase in shootings. Others believe 
it is a result of public misconceptions or attitude-action correlations. 
 However, even though there is considerable research on attitudes 
towards gun regulations, there is little understanding of how terrorist activity 
specifically affects those attitudes toward gun control. The potential effects 
of terrorism on these attitudes could follow similar patterns of what this 
literature represents. It is possible that effects of terrorism on public opinion 
will split along demographic divisions that are already present, and it is also 
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possible that people’s attitudes toward gun policy will not change no matter 
the scenario they are presented. Therefore, it is important to understand the 
current state of public opinion on gun control as well as the basic theories 
associated with why people form their opinions before attempting to 
determine how, and if, terrorism affects them. 
Terrorism Theories  
 Before analyzing how terrorist activity relates to gun control opinions, 
it is important to understand the basic theories of terrorism. Terrorism is 
defined as the “use of violence against civilians by non state actors to attain 
political goals” (Kydd & Walter 2006). Groups engage in terrorism because 
it is successful in getting them what they want, whether it be regime change, 
territorial change, policy change, social control, or status quo maintenance 
(Kydd & Walter 2006).  Because they are weak actors in the political 
spectrum, terrorists have to employ a form of costly signaling to impose 
their will (Kidd & Walter 2006). Because terrorists are smaller 
organizations, there are specific strategies they use to attain their goals: 
attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding (Kidd & Walter 
2006). 
 The strategy of attrition involves sending a costly signal to 
demonstrate to the enemy that the group is strong and resolute enough to 
inflict serious costs so that the enemy yields to the terrorists’ demands (Kydd 
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& Walter 2006). Suicide terrorism is an example of this. Intimidation is 
preventing some undesired behavior by means of threats and costly signals. 
This shows that the group has power to punish whoever goes against them 
and that the government is powerless to control them (Kydd & Walter 2006). 
The strategy of provocation is designed to persuade the domestic population 
the the state is untrustworthy and must be resisted. It is an attempt to 
provoke a response from the government that harms civilians and portrays 
the state as evil to get civilians on the terrorists’ side (Kydd & Walter 2006). 
Spoiling is a strategy that aims to “spoil” any peace attempts being made 
between two groups. The key is to play on the mistrust between the two 
groups and to persuade the enemy that moderates on the terrorists’ side can’t 
be trusted (Kydd & Walter 2006). Outbidding occurs when two or more 
domestic parties or terrorist groups are competing for leadership and one 
group attacks to send a signal that that particular group is strong and the side 
you want to be on (Kydd & Walter 2006).  
 Public opinion is important as it relates to terrorist activity because 
without the public’s attention, terrorist have no leverage (Downes-Le Guin 
& Hoffman 1993). In the United States, the issue of terrorism has grabbed 
the public’s attention at different intensities throughout its history. Generally, 
only when asked about terrorism specifically do Americans believe terrorism 
to be a high world problem, and most Americans believe terrorism to be a 
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greater threat in other parts of the world than in the United States (Downes-
Le Guin & Hoffman 1993). However, when attacks happen on home soil, 
such as the Boston Bombings, Americans are much more likely to feel 
threatened by terrorism and are less likely to view the government as 
effective in preventing it (LeFree 2014). This suggests that terrorist activity 
within the US affects public opinion more so than when terrorist activity is 
viewed as a distant threat (LeFree 2014).  
 Additionally, American attitudes toward terrorist groups and terrorists 
are not generally as negative as one might think. While the majority of 
people “despise” terrorist acts and terrorist groups as it pertains to Muslim 
activity, small proportions show favor to groups such as the Jewish Defense 
League and the Irish Republican Army (Downes-Le Guin & Hoffman 1993). 
Attitudes toward terrorists individually were not held in as low of a regard, 
with nearly half of respondents believing that individuals could have 
legitimate grievances (Downes-Le Guin & Hoffman 1993). In regards to 
combatting terrorism, the majority believe that the government must act 
even if the actions are not very effective, and most favor diplomatic 
solutions as opposed to use of force (Downes-Le Guin & Hoffman 1993). In 
light of this, opinion regarding terrorism and terrorists might not be as 
generalized or as clear as assumed.  
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Terrorism and Guns 
 After understanding the theories and public opinion of terrorism 
generally, it is important to discuss terrorist activity and their use of guns in 
order to begin to assess how that activity affects the public’s opinion on gun 
control legislation, if there is an affect at all.  
 Overtime, the number of incidents of terror attacks involving firearms 
across the world has increased (Do people associate guns). However, in the 
US, the number of such attacks had been decreasing since the 1970’s until 
recently (Do people associate guns). Even though terrorism accounts for a 
small percentage of deaths per year in the US, from 2002 to 2014, 85% of 
people killed in the US by terrorists were killed through the use of a firearm 
(Do people associate guns). Because of this trend, it is likely that people are 
beginning to associate terrorism with some use of a firearm.  
 In further analyzation of terrorist activity since the 1970’s, out of the 
2,400 attacks in the US during this period, 324 of those involved firearms, 
accounting for about 13% of terrorist attacks (Miller 2015). This percentage 
is approximately one third as common as firearm usage in terror attacks in 
the rest of the world, where attacks using firearms account for 37%. Even 
though more than half of all terrorist attacks in the US involved explosives 
since 1970, attacks involving firearms are more likely to be lethal and are 
used in attacks that are aimed at causing human casualties (Miller 2015). 
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This could lead to instilling a higher level of fear, and therefore concern, of 
attacks using firearms. Additionally, in recent years, none of the 35 terrorist 
attacks in the US involving firearms were carried out by groups based 
outside of the US. The majority of these attacks were carried out by 
unaffiliated individuals (Miller 2015). If these are seen as isolated attacks, 
then previous evidence shows that, even though they are perpetrated by self 
proclaimed terrorists, they might not spur as much public support for gun 
control as expected.  
 The fact that terrorists are just recently increasing the use of firearms 
in perpetrating their attacks could be why the relationship between terrorist 
activity and public opinion on gun control hasn’t been extensively studied — 
it is a relatively new phenomenon, especially in the United States. 
Additionally, the increase of use of firearms by terrorists also highlights the 
importance and relevance of this study. Terrorists and guns, while not 
extensively researched, is and existent and growing issue, specifically in the 
United States. However, to assess if there is any change in support for gun 
control as a result of terrorist violence and shootings, it is important to 
understand why such activity might spur different reactions from the public 
than non-terrorist activity.  
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In-group and Out-group Theories 
 Understanding the attitudes and perceptions of in-groups and out-
groups is the first step in determining and explaining the potential difference 
in public opinion on gun control as a result of terrorist activity. There has 
been a multitude of research regarding theories of why different groups feel 
the way they do about each other. A fundamental element of this is that 
fearing outsiders and people that are different is instinctual and is one of 
mans’ oldest, built in psychological tendencies (Resnick 2017). 
 Additionally, when certain groups fear others, the feared group, or 
out-group, tends to be dehumanized by members of the in-group. People 
attribute “outsiders” has having fewer human qualities compared to how 
they view members of their own group, and they also give them less 
empathy (Resnick 2017). This is the theory of out-group homogeneity, 
which predicts that the perception of variability within a group is influenced 
by one’s status as an in-group or out-group member, specifically that in 
group members perceive their own group as more varied and complex than 
the perceive out-group members (Park 1982). Studies have proved this 
theory of out-group homogeneity in that out-group members were more 
stereotypic in describing the in-group than the in-group was of describing 
themselves, that the in-group viewed itself as more varied and counter 
stereotypic (Park 1982). Additionally, each group is more favorably 
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evaluated by itself than it is by other groups, suggesting a strong 
ethnocentrism effect (Park 1982). 
 When fear is involved, the threat of out-groups is exaggerated. 
However, the boundaries of who groups see as “us” and “them” can be 
easily changed (Resnick 2017). Humans have a need for social constructs 
and social order, and intergroup discrimination has been found to be a way 
to satisfy this need (Billig & Tajfel 1973). When there is no distinction 
between groups, members choose fairness in treatment to all other members 
(Billig & Tajfel 1973). However, as soon as differentiation evolves, the need 
for constructs kicks in and members discriminate in favor of the in-group 
(Billig & Tajfel 1973). If different distinctions are made and groups change, 
the new in-group is then favored (Billig & Tajfel 1973). This shows that 
while discrimination is easily triggered, who members view as “us” and 
“them” is flexible.  
 Members’ feelings and emotions toward their own group can effect 
their feelings and emotions toward out-groups (Brewer 1999). While it was 
traditionally accepted that in-group identification is independent of negative 
attitudes toward out-groups and that much intergroup discrimination is 
motivated by preferential treatment of in-group members rather than 
hostility toward out-group members, more recent research has found that in-
group favoritism and out-group negativity are reciprocally related (Brewer 
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1999). There are five instances in which in-group preference can lead to out-
group negativity: when an in-group feels morally superior to an out-group, 
when the out-group is a perceived threat, when there are common goals that 
promote scapegoating and competition, when groups share common values 
in which it is difficult for positive distinctions to be made, and when 
political leaders exploit existing negative attitudes to gain or maintain power 
(Brewer 1999). 
 It is safe to conclude that members of an in-group tend to dehumanize, 
stereotype, and have negative feelings toward members of an out-group, and 
therefore apply those attitudes toward the out-group generally. So how could 
those attitudes and perceptions of out-group members lead to changes in 
opinion on gun control? 
Fear of Out-groups and Support for Security Measures 
 After understanding basic in-group and out-group theories, it is 
important to evaluate if those theories of in-group preference, stereotyping, 
and out-group fear or hate have an affect on preference of public policy. 
Multiple studies analyzing public attitudes on out-groups post 9/11 have 
found similar results of out-group fear and perceived threat leading to 
greater support of restrictionist policies in order to preserve security.  
 The terrorist attacks of 9/11 spurred an era of increased national 
identity and unity that restricted the concept of American identity to being 
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Anglo, Christian, and English speaking (Branton et al. 2011). This led to the 
stereotyping of and hostilities toward Muslims, because they were seen as 
the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks, as well as the stereotyping of and 
hostilities toward Latinos, because their threat of illegal immigration was 
becoming a nationalized issue (Branton et al. 2011, Huddy 2005). Fear and 
perceived threat of these out-groups lead to increased public support for 
greater restrictive measures in the interest of national security. 
 For example, growing animosity and fear of Muslims and Latinos led 
to greater support for stricter immigration policies post 9/11 (Branton et al. 
2011, Huddy 2005). In fact, greater fear and anti-out-group attitudes 
increased the probability that a respondent will prefer increased 
restrictionism in order to preserve security (Branton et al. 2011). The out-
group threat context post-9/11 amplified hostilities towards the Latino and 
Arab communities, and therefore increased preferences for strict 
immigration policy following 9/11 (Branton et al. 2011, Huddy 2005). In 
essence, the fear that Latinos and Muslims instilled and the threat they 
presented led the public to increasingly support restrictive measures to 
increase security.  
 More generally, the increase of perceived threat and fear post-9/11 
also increased support in limiting civil liberties in the interest of preserving 
security and preventing a future terrorist attack (Huddy 2005, Davis & Silver 
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2004). Americans who perceive a high future threat of terrorism are more 
likely to support civil liberty restrictions and cede their civil liberties in the 
interest of security (Huddy 2005, Davis & Silver 2004). Furthermore, 
emotional reactions to threat, such as fear, lead to greater support for 
personal security and therefore government efforts to reduce the risk of 
future terrorist attacks, even if it means compromising civil liberties and 
increasing restrictive policies (Davis & Silver 2004, Lerner 2003). After 
9/11, fear enhanced support and preferences for conciliatory policies and 
investment in precautionary public policy measures (Davis & Silver 2004, 
Lerner 2003). 
 Notably, however, women are more likely cede their civil liberties in 
the interest of security (Lerner 2003). Experiencing anger in response to 
terrorist attacks activates policy preferences that punish the offenders, and 
experiencing fear in response to attacks activates conciliatory policy 
preferences and greater support for  precautionary measures (Lerner 2003). 
In addition, anger is associated with perceiving a lower risk of a terrorist 
attack and more optimism in combating them and fear is associated with 
perceiving a higher risk of a terrorist attack and more pessimism in 
combating such attacks (Lerner 2003). Males show more anger, lower 
perceived risk, and more optimism in combating terrorist attacks, and 
females show more fear, higher perceived risk, and more pessimism in 
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combating terrorist attacks, and are therefore more likely to cede their civil 
liberties (Lerner 2003). These emotional differences explain 60 to 80% of 
the gender difference on their support for more restrictive policies (Lerner 
2003). Essentially, the different emotions males and females feel in response 
to terrorist attacks affects their perceived threat and therefore their 
preferences on policies in response to terrorism. 
 It is clear that emotional responses to out-group activity, such as fear 
caused from a greater perceived threat, leads to increased support for greater 
restrictionist policies and an increased willingness to give up civil liberties in 
the interest of security. It is important to note, however, that the particular 
emotion felt has an impact on the type of policy supported. While fear tends 
to lead to greater support for restrictionism policies, anger does not appear to 
have the same effect. However, in the issue of gun control, public support 
goes beyond the reach of terrorist activity and moves from a general notion 
of perceived out-group threat to a more specific one of racial resentment that 
stemmed from the Civil Rights Era - several decades before terrorist use of 
guns became prevalent in American society.  
Racial Resentment 
 Gun control and its relation to race and racial resentment has been an 
issue since the Civil Rights Era. Racial resentment has grown out of the 
increased political participation of historically marginalized groups because 
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many believe that such groups are making illegitimate claims for “special” 
rights and not “equal” rights (Dudas 2005). Such resentments continue to 
flourish because as historically marginalized groups make claims for 
“special” rights, or rights beyond what their achievements merit as some see, 
others’ traditional ways of life and privilege are threatened (Dudas 2005). 
Conservative activists have increasingly channeled their resentment over the 
uncertainty introduced by the participation of historically marginalize people 
by interpreting their rights claims as illegitimate or special rights that 
threaten core American values (Dudas 2005). This contributes to 
conservatives advocating rights they believe to be based on individual merit 
and equal opportunity, such as gun rights (Dudas 2005).  
 Because of these racial resentments and racial divides, opinion on gun 
control has increasingly been viewed as a product of cultural traits, and 
conflicting views can be the result of conflicting traits (Kleck 1996). The 
notion of conflict can come in many forms, but historically certain groups 
have held certain policy opinions in order to maintain some type of social 
prestige or status. Just as the middle class, rural, protestant groups supported 
the temperance movement to preserve their status in the early 1900s, 
generally the same group of people oppose gun control today in order to 
achieve the same outcome (Kleck 1996).  
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 In relating in-groups and out-groups to gun control, studies have 
found that racial divides affect opinion on gun control (Filindra & Kaplan 
2016). The civil rights era spurred in whites a defense of their privilege as 
their way of life was threatened, and they began to view the government 
protections of previously suppressed groups as preferential treatment and a 
threat to their traditional values (Filindra & Kaplan 2016). This led to racial 
resentment. Because of the formation of such racial resentment, today there 
exists a causal relationship between racial considerations and gun policy 
preference among whites (Filindra & Kaplan 2016). 
 It is safe to conclude that racial resentment and racial stereotyping 
have an affect on gun control preferences. Such evidence of racial 
resentment and association of blacks with guns has been extensively 
researched, and has the potential to be applied to people from the Middle 
East. It is likely that the association that exists between blacks and guns 
could also have the same effect on Muslims and guns due to terrorists 
increase use of firearms.  
Literature Review Conclusions 
 Literature on public opinion of gun control finds that, in the United 
States, such opinions are divided along partisan, demographic, and 
ideological lines. While this opinion changes over time, the US is currently 
at a point where it is less willing to restrict gun control, and shootings, even 
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if they are highly publicized, do not seem to have a lasting impact on public 
opinion. This overall decrease for support for stricter gun control has been 
attributed to declining belief in its effectiveness, how society views the acts 
of violence, and misperceptions about what gun control measures already 
exist. These are important implication in how terrorism can affect gun policy 
opinion. If society believes that gun control measures are ineffective, then 
there might not be increased support even when there is a terrorist attack 
involving a shooting. If society views a terrorist attack as isolated, there may 
be no increased support for gun control, but if they view the attack as a 
societal problem, they might support increasing gun restrictions. 
Additionally, if society is misperceived about what gun regulations are 
currently in place, that may affect their support for additional policies even 
when a terrorist shooting occurs.  
 In addition, literature on terrorism finds that terrorist utilize such 
violent activity because it is successful in getting them what they want. 
Terrorists have one or a combination of one of five goals: regime change, 
territorial change, policy change, social control, or status quo maintenance. 
In order to achieve these goals, terrorists employ a strategy of attrition, 
intimidation, provocation, spoiling, or outbidding. Literature on terrorism 
also finds that Americans feel more threatened by terrorist activity when 
they are directly or more closely affected, such as when there is a terrorist 
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attack on American soil. When people feel more threatened and emotionally 
respond to terrorist attacks in fear, they are more likely to support more 
restrictive policies and more willing to give up civil liberties in interest of 
security. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that fear generated from 
terrorists, members of an out-group, are likely to cause an increase in 
support for greater gun restrictions and other security measures.  
 Research has also found that the use of firearms in terrorists attacks is 
increasing across the world. While such use of firearms in terrorist attacks 
had been decreasing in the United States, it is now on the rise again. In fact, 
the majority of deaths caused by a terrorist attack in the United States was 
perpetrated using a firearm. Because of this increase, terrorism and how it 
relates to public opinion on gun control is a current issue that warrants 
investigation and research.  
  While both gun control and terrorism have been investigated deeply 
in their own regards, there has been little research done that attempts to 
combine the two areas. However, with evidence of negative attitudes and 
fear of out-groups coupled with evidence that fear of out-groups leads to 
increased support for restrictionist policies and an increased willingness to 
give up civil liberties, it is reasonable to assume that terrorist violence, 
activity perpetrated by an out-group member, will have an affect on public 
opinion of gun control. This study attempts to bridge the gap in current 
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research and attempts to determine if terrorist activity and the method of 
terrorist activity have an affect on public opinion of gun control.  
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THEORY 
Support for Gun Control based on Weapon 
 The role of guns in terrorist attacks is changing in that terrorists are 
increasingly using guns to perpetrate their attacks. Such attacks are also 
more likely to be lethal and usually result in greater human casualties. 
Because of this, I expect that there will be greater support for gun control 
when terrorists use firearms than when they use other methods to perpetrate 
violence, such as explosives.    
 The number of terrorist attacks involving firearms has increased 
across the globe (Do people associate guns). In the United States, however, 
terrorist attacks involving firearms have been decreasing until recently, 
making their use in such attacks a fairly new concern in the United States. 
Specifically, from 2002 to 2014, 85% of people killed in the United States 
by terrorists were killed through use of a firearm (Do people associate guns). 
Terrorists are increasing their use of firearms in terrorist attacks because they 
have different objectives now than they did in the past, such as taking human 
life, and these objectives are more easily met through the use of a firearm 
(Spencer 2006). Because of this increased use of guns by terrorists, it is 
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likely that people are beginning to associate terrorist attacks with the use of a 
firearm. 
 Even though terrorist attacks using explosives are much more 
common in the United States, attacks involving firearms are much more 
likely to be lethal (Miller 2015). This trend is represented in  Figure  1, 
which was adopted from the Global Terrorism Database. Attacks using 
firearms are usually perpetrated with the intent of inflicting human 
casualties, whereas the use of explosives is usually aimed at causing 
property damage or achieving some other type of goal, with human 
casualties generally not the primary objective (Miller 2015). Terrorism today 
has become more indiscriminate and is aimed more at the destruction of 
society and the elimination of large sections of the population, producing as 
many casualties as possible (Spencer 2006). The threat and fear of lethal 
violence leads to action and support of increased measures to ensure 
personal security (Tolnay & Beck 1990). Because the use of firearms in 
terrorist attacks is becoming more common and tends to be more lethal, and 
because fear of lethal violence leads to increased support in measures to 
ensure safety, I theorize that respondents will be more likely to support gun 
control measures after attacks using firearms as opposed to attacks using 
explosives.  
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Support for Gun Control Based on Perpetrator 
 Research has found that there is a connection between fear of out-
groups and increased support of restrictionist policies. Because of this, I 
expect that there will be a difference in support for gun control depending on 
the perpetrator, and that support for gun control is not simply a reaction to 
all violence. Specifically, I predict that there will be greater support for gun 
control when violence is perpetrated by an out-group member or terrorist 
than when violence is perpetrated by an in-group member.  
 The Out-group Homogeneity Theory states that in-group members 
perceive members of their own group as more varied and complex than they 
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Figure 1   The percentage of terrorist attacks involving firearms, 1970-2014 
Source: Miller, Erin. "Use of Firearms in Terrorist Attacks the United States 
1970-2014.” START. Department of Homeland Security. Accessed January 2017. 
http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/ 
START_FirearmsinTerrorism_BackgroundReport_July2015.pdf 
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do out-group members, leading to dehumanization of the out-group (Resnick 
2017, Park 1982). In other words, when in-group members view out-group 
members as all sharing similar qualities, the out-group members loose their 
individuality in the eyes of the in-group and are viewed as a whole (Resnick 
2017, Park 1982). Those in-group self views of variance and complexity are 
viewed positively and are preferred among in-group members (Brewer 
1999). However, literature has found that this preferential treatment of in-
group member is reciprocally related to negative perceptions of out-group 
members (Brewer 1999). This dehumanization makes it easy to discriminate 
against out-group members because of the negative way they are naturally 
viewed by in-group members. 
  However, these negative views of out-group members are especially 
significant when an out-group is perceived as a threat (Brewer 1999). 
Therefore, if out-groups are perceived as a threat, they are viewed in a 
negative light. Additionally, since out-groups are “dehumanized” and are 
perceived as all sharing similar characteristics and qualities, it can be 
reasoned that when a group is viewed as a threat, these negative emotions 
and discriminations apply to all members of that out-group. 
 This effect was evidenced in the post-9/11 era. After the 9/11 terrorists 
attacks, Americans stereotyped Muslims and viewed them all as a threat to 
national security (Branton et al. 2011, Huddy 2005). Muslims were a threat, 
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they were viewed negatively, and the actions and ideals of a few were 
attributed to the whole, as explained by the Out-group Homogeneity theory.  
 Additionally, this perception of threat that causes out-group 
discrimination is easily triggered when fear is involved (Resnick 2017, Billig 
& Tajfel 1973). Ever since 9/11, there has been a greater perceived threat of 
Muslims as they relate to terrorist activity, and that greater perceived threat 
has led to greater fear of terrorism (Branton et al. 2011, Huddy 2005). 
Feelings of threat often correlate with policy choices at fairly strong levels 
(Gordon & Arian 2001). The more threatened people feel, the more intense 
their policy choices are, and the less threatened they feel, the more subdued 
their policy preferences are (Gordon & Arian 2001). As more terrorist 
attacks throughout the world continue to get high publicity and media 
attention, it is inevitable that with each attack, the perceived threat of 
terrorists, and therefore public fear of Muslims and terrorists, increases. The 
9/11 terrorist attacks served as a trigger that initiated a greater perceived 
threat of terrorists and therefore fear of terrorists in American society 
(Branton et al. 2011, Huddy 2005). 
 With increased public fear comes increased support of restrictionist 
policies and a greater willingness to give up civil liberties (Branton et al. 
2011, Huddy 2005, Davis & Silver 2004). When people feel threatened, their 
decision making is dominated by emotion, such as fear (Gordon & Arian 
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2001). After 9/11, fear and increased negative perceptions of out-groups, 
specifically anti-Muslim and anti-Latino sentiment, led to increased support 
for restrictive immigration policies in order to increase security and protect 
against a future terrorist attack (Branton et al. 2011 & Huddy 2005). 
Additionally, fear of terrorists and future terrorist attacks also increased 
support in limiting civil liberties in the interest of preserving security and 
preventing a future terrorist attack (Huddy 2005, Davis & Silver 2004). Fear 
of terrorists, the out-group, led to increased support for measures to increase 
security. 
 The Out-Group Homogeneity theory leads to similar perceptions of 
individuals within an out-group, and natural tendency causes negative 
attitudes toward out-groups. These negative tendencies are amplified when 
an out-group is perceived as a threat, and a greater perceived threat increases 
the fear of an out group. Since fear of out-groups leads to increased public 
support for more restrictionist policies, I predict that terrorist attacks, 
perpetrated by a negatively perceived out-group, trigger a deeper fear than 
attacks and shootings perpetrated by a more favorably perceived in-group, 
and therefore theorize that there will be greater support for gun control after 
attacks committed by Muslim terrorists.   
 However, it is possible that this hypothesis might not hold. Since the 
boundaries of who is perceived as an in-group member and out-group 
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member are flexible, it is possible that simply anyone who is a perpetrator of 
violence could be viewed as an out-group member, therefore causing little 
variance in levels of support between the treatment groups since they could 
possibly all be viewed as an out-group (Resnick 2017). Additionally, the 
treatments may not evoke the same emotional response that real-life terrorist 
events and shootings evoke in the public, possibly leading to results that are 
not significant (Branton et al. 2011 & Hudley 2005).  
Sub Group Effects 
 Additionally, I theorize that the effects presented in the first two 
hypotheses will be conditional on a variety of factors, specifically the 
respondent’s gender, their estimation of the percent of Muslim population in 
the United States, and whether they live in urban or rural areas. 
Gender  
 In regards to gender, I hypothesize that there will be a difference in 
the level of support for gun control measures between males and females, 
with females being more likely to support more restrictive policies than 
males. I base this theory off of research that has found that men and women 
respond to terrorism in different ways emotionally, and that these different 
emotional reactions are what determines the type of policies an individual 
will support (Lerner 2003). For example, Men are more likely to experience 
anger in response to terrorism (Lerner 2003). Anger is associated with 
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perceiving a lower risk or threat of a terrorist attack and more optimism in 
combating such attacks (Lerner 2003). Mens’ likelihood of feeling anger 
activates policy preferences that punish the offenders, not preferences that 
focus on improving security (Lerner 2003). However, females are more 
likely to experience fear in response to terrorism (Lerner 2003). This fear is 
associated with perceiving a higher risk or threat of a terrorist attack and 
more pessimism in ability to combat such attacks (Lerner 2003). Feeling fear 
in response to terrorist attacks activates greater support for precautionary 
measures (Lerner 2003). Fear of out-groups in general has been found to to 
increase support of restrictionist policies and has been found to make 
individuals more likely to cede their civil liberties in the interest of security 
(Branton et al. 2011, Huddy 2005, Davis & Silver 2004). Since women are 
more likely to feel fear in response to terrorist attacks, this fear makes them 
more likely to support precautionary and restrictive measures to increase 
security (Lerner 2003, Branton et al. 2011, Huddy 2005, Davis & Silver 
2004). Therefore, I predict that women will show a higher support for 
increased gun control and security measures because they are more likely to 
respond to terrorism with fear - an emotive response that has been shown to 
increase support for restrictive, precautionary measures (Lerner 2003, 
Branton et al. 2011, Huddy 2005, Davis & Silver 2004). 
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Fear of Muslims 
 I also hypothesize that respondents who greatly overestimate the 
percentage of the Muslim population in the United States will be more likely 
to support increased gun regulation. I base this theory off of research that 
has found that fear of out-groups increases support for restrictive policies 
and makes individuals more likely to be willing to cede their civil liberties in 
the interest of security (Branton, et al. 2001, Huddy 2005, Davis & Silver 
2004).  
 The 9/11 terrorist attacks spurred a new era of perceived threat of out-
groups in the United States, specifically against Muslims and Latinos, 
because Americans began to view them as a threat to their security and way 
of live (Branton et al. 2011). This greater perceived threat and fear of these 
out-groups lead to increased public support for greater restrictive 
immigration policies in the interest of national security (Branton et al. 2011, 
Huddy 2005). In addition, the increased perceived threat and fear of out-
groups post-9/11 also increased support in limiting civil liberties in the 
interest of preserving security and preventing a future terrorist attack 
(Hudley 2005, Davis & Silver 2004). Specifically, Americans who perceived 
a high future threat of terrorism are more likely to support civil liberty 
restrictions and cede their civl liberties (Huddy 2005, Davis & Silver 2004). 
Therefore, if previous literature has found that fear and threat of an out-
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group has led to greater restrictionist policies in the past, such as limiting 
immigration, and has also led to a greater willingness in ceding civil liberties 
generally in the interest of national security, then I predict that those same 
perceived threats and fears of terrorists and out-groups, as evidenced in 
overestimations of the Muslim population in the US, will lead to greater 
support of restrictionist policies on gun control. The use of estimation of 
Muslim population as a proxy for perception of threat is justified in the 
research design.  
Proximity to likely Terrorist Attacks 
 I also theorize that respondents who live in rural areas will be less 
likely to support increased gun control measures than respondents who live 
in urban areas. This theory is based off of research that has found that rural 
areas are more likely to oppose gun restrictions because they are culturally 
different from urban areas in how they view gun control and that urban areas 
are more likely to support gun control because of higher levels of fear 
(Smith 1980). 
 As one moves away from rural areas and toward urban areas, 
opposition to gun control decreases (Smith 1980). Likewise, opposition 
increases when one moves away from urban centers toward more rural areas 
(Smith 1980). One explanation of this difference in opinion is that the “gun 
culture” changes as one moves from rural to urban areas (Smith 1980, 
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Wolpert and Gimpel 1998). The gun culture traditionally represents an 
attachment to firearms due to their historical importance in the United 
State’s history, their role in the frontier experience, their role in the hunting 
and sporting experience, and all the traditions that have accompanied these 
experiences (Smith 1980, Wolpert and Gimpel 1998). However, today the 
gun culture revolves mainly around hunting, sporting, and other related 
purposes (Wolpert and Gimpel 1998). Residence in rural localities and 
regions provides continuing exposure to this traditional gun culture, and gun 
ownership is prevalent among groups partaking in this culture and living in 
areas where it is still prevalent (Smith 1980). Therefore, gun owners tend to 
live in rural areas (Smith 1980, Wolpert and Gimpel 1998). Gun owners in 
turn show a strong relationship to opposition to gun control because it is a 
threat to their self interest and preservation of their culture (Smith 1980, 
Wolpert and Gimpel 1998). Members of the non-gun culture are less 
opposed to gun control because its members own fewer guns and reside in 
non rural localities (Smith 1980). Therefore, since rural areas have an 
extensive gun culture and since they have higher percentage of gun owners, I 
predict that rural areas exhibit greater opposition to gun control measures 
than urban areas, even in response to terrorism, because they have a different 
cultural perspective of gun usage that is not easily changed. 
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 Additionally, place of residence exerts an influence on gun control 
attitudes through associated levels of fear (Smith 1980). Members in the non 
gun culture, those living in urban areas, show less opposition to gun control 
because they live in areas stimulating more fear through being exposed to 
higher levels of crime (Smith 1980). Research has shown that fear leads to 
increased support for restrictive policies and increased willingness to give up 
civil liberties in the interest of security (Branton et al. 2011, Huddy 2005, 
Davis & Silver 2004). Therefore, urban areas are less opposed to gun control 
because they are typically not members of the gun culture and also live in 
communities causing more fear because of crime levels. Because current 
fear of crime already exists, respondents who live in urban areas answers to 
gun policy questions should remain greater than those in rural areas. 
Therefore, since rural areas are more entrenched in gun culture and tend to 
have more gun owners and since urban areas are not as entrenched in the 
gun culture and already have higher levels of fear even without the threat of 
terrorism, I predict that, even when exposed to terrorism treatments, 
respondents who live in rural areas will be more opposed to gun regulation 
proposals than those who live in urban areas.  
 39
METHOD 
Research Design 
 To test the hypotheses, I conducted a survey that builds on another 
survey experiment that analyzed public opinion about gun control. I modeled 
my survey and research design after an experiment conducted by McGinty, 
Webster, and Barry that was published in the American Journal of 
Psychiatry. In their experiment, they analyzed the effects of news media 
messages about mass shootings on attitudes toward people with serious 
mental illness and public support for gun control policies (McGinty, 
Webster, and Barry 2013). 
 The survey-embedded randomized experiment by McGinty, Webster, 
and Barry was dispersed through an online survey research panel, in which 
members on the panel were recruited through equal probability sampling. 
Members were paid with small cash rewards and gift prizes for their survey 
responses. (McGinty, Webster, and Barry 2013). 
 The respondents in their survey were randomly assigned either to one 
of three groups who read different short news stories or to a no-exposure 
control group (McGinty, Webster, and Barry 2013). After reading the news 
stories, respondents were asked questions about their opinions of people 
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with mental illness, support for gun restrictions for such people, and support 
for a ban on large-capacity magazines (McGinty, Webster, and Barry 2013). 
The no-exposure group answered these questions without reading any of the 
news stories (McGinty, Webster, and Barry 2013).  
 Like the experiment conducted by McGinty, Webster, and Barry, this 
experiment attempts to assess effects of violent actions on public support for 
gun control, only in this case it analyzes how violent activity perpetrated by 
terrorists affects those opinions as opposed to the mentally ill. Like the 
model experiment, this experiment involved dispersing the survey through 
an online survey panel, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, and respondents were 
compensated for their responses. The survey took approximately 4 minutes 
to complete, and the respondents were paid $0.50 for their time based on the 
national minimum wage.  
 Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is a relatively inexpensive survey 
platform that allows academics and other professionals easy access to survey 
respondents (Huff & Tingley 2015). Because of this, it has surged in 
popularity, especially among political scientists, as a means for conducting 
research (Huff & Tingley 2015). However, scholars have criticized the 
external validity of using the source, questioning the demographic, political, 
professional, and geographic variability of the respondents (Huff & Tingley 
2015). If typical respondents through MTurk are not representative, then 
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research using the survey platform may not be viewed as valid. However, 
research has found that when comparing the distributions of age, gender, and 
race characteristics as well as  political, occupational, and geographical 
information of the respondents, the results generated from the use of MTurk 
as the survey platform are not significantly different than responses 
generated through other survey platforms (Huff & Tingley 2015). Therefore, 
in this experiment, we view the MTurk survey platform as a valid form of 
assessing public opinion.  
 In addition, this experiment was formatted similarly to the model 
study (McGinty, Webster, and Barry 2013). The test sample of 202 
respondents was randomly divided into four groups - either to the no-
exposure control group or to one of the three groups that read a short 
scenario describing a shooting or an attempted terrorist attack to attempt to 
asses how each treatment affected responses on opinions of gun control. 
Before the respondents were presented with the policy questions and the 
scenarios, all groups were given an attention check to assess if the 
respondent was fully and carefully reading the questions. After the 
respondents in the treatment groups read the short scenarios, they were 
asked questions about their opinions on gun policy and other security 
measures to asses if the scenarios had an affect on respondents’ opinions 
about gun control and other security measures. Members of the control 
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group answered the same questions without reading a short scenario 
describing a shooting or terrorist activity. This provided a base group of non-
affected opinions to compare to affected opinions of respondents in other 
groups. After respondents answered the policy questions, all treatment 
groups were presented with a manipulation check that asked them to recall 
the religion of the perpetrator of violence in the scenario they read as well as 
the type of weapon that was used.  
 To further differentiate possible trends among respondents and their 
answers about their opinion on gun control, demographic questions were 
asked similar to those asked in the model experiment (McGinty, Webster, 
and Barry 2013). Before respondents were asked to answer questions about 
their gun policy opinions, they were asked to identify their age, gender, race, 
level of education, income, and partisanship to determine if the results of the 
hypotheses would differ along conditional variables (McGinty, Webster, and 
Barry 2013). This was done because previous research has shown that 
opinions on gun control tend to vary among these demographic lines. 
Including those characteristics in this experiment allowed us to test 
previously found trends along with the hypotheses.  
 Additionally, at the beginning of the experiment, respondents were 
also asked to indicate what they believe to be the percentage of Christians, 
Jews, and Muslims in the United States (Grewal, Cebul, and Kustov 2016). 
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While this was not part of the model experiment, it was added in this 
experiment to help determine if fear of Muslims correlated to increased 
support for gun control measures in groups that read scenarios describing 
Muslim activity or in the control group. This would help to analyze the 
hypothesis of greater support for gun control as it relates to terrorists/out-
groups as a result of fear.  
 In addition, since opinion on gun control tends to divide along party 
lines in the United States, respondents who identified as “Independent” or “I 
don’t know” to the partisanship question were then asked to indicate if they 
identified more closely to the Republican or Democratic Party. This was an 
important distinction because it could help draw connections between party 
identification and opinion on gun control in the data, and how those groups 
then differ in opinion among the different groups in how they support/do not 
support increased gun control.  
Treatments 
 The primary independent variables of interest in this study were the 
three randomly assigned short scenarios describing a shooting or terrorist 
attack. All scenarios were about 2-3 sentences and were parallel in structure, 
giving the name of the attacker, the weapon used, the casualty count, the 
race/religion of the attacker, his motive for the attack, and how the attack 
was resolved, respectively. The goal was to make each scenario as similar as 
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possible, and they were all based off of a real life event. The text of the 
scenarios can be found in Table 2. Respondents who were assigned to read a  
scenario were instructed to “Please read the following news statement,” and 
after they read the scenario read “We would now like to ask you a few 
questions about public policy.” Respondents would then answer the three 
questions about gun control and security, followed by the manipulation 
check. Members of the control group simply read “We would now like to ask 
you a few questions about public policy” before answering the gun control 
and security questions.  
 The respondents were grouped in the three treatment groups and the 
control group to assess how each scenario they read (or did not read) 
affected their opinion on security measures. Assessing the differences in 
responses across groups was essential in evaluating the hypotheses that out-
group violence leads to greater support for gun control and that the method 
of violence determines support for gun control. A scenario describing a 
white, non-religiously affiliated shooter was used to determine if 
respondents’ opinions would be different after reading a scenario describing 
a “in-group member” (a white man as the perpetrator), as opposed to an 
“out-group member” (a Muslim, terrorist-affiliated perpetrator). This was 
important in testing the hypothesis of there being greater support for gun 
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Table 2   Experimental conditions and scenario text (N = 202)
Group Scenario N
Control No scenario 51
White gunman Noah Harpham opened fire on 
civilians in Colorado Springs, 
Colorado, killing three civilians. 
While his motive is unknown, it has 
been identified that the gunman, a 
white male at the age of 33, had 
problems with alcoholism and was 
in an argument with his father at the 
time of the shooting. Harp ham was 
not affiliated with any organization 
that inspired or endorsed his actions. 
50
Muslim gunman Ali Muhammad Brown opened fire 
on civilians in Seattle, Washington, 
killing two civilians. The gunman, a 
self proclaimed Muslim, stated that 
his motive was to commit an act of 
vengeance against the United States 
to punish it for its involvement in 
Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. No 
terrorist organization claimed 
responsibility for the attack, and 
Brown was convicted for the 
murders. 
50
Muslim bomber Faisal Shahzad planted a car bomb 
in New York City, New York, that 
failed to detonate. While there were 
no casualties, it is possible that 
people could have been killed or 
injured if the bomb had exploded. 
Shahzad claimed he was a Muslim 
soldier and warned the United States 
to leave Muslim lands alone. No 
terrorist group immediately claimed 
responsibility for the bomb. 
51
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control after violence committed by terrorists than violence committed by 
other groups. 
 The scenario describing a Muslim gunman was utilized to determine if 
respondents in that group were more likely to support gun control and other 
security measures than members in other groups. This variable is important 
in determining if terrorist activity and the method of terrorism have an effect 
on public opinion of gun control, particularly in testing the hypothesis that 
violence perpetrated by a terrorist (out-group) is more likely to increase 
support for gun control than other groups (in-groups).  
 A third scenario that described Islamic terrorist activity utilizing an 
explosive was also described to determine specifically if the mode or method 
of terrorist activity had an effect on public opinion of gun control. This 
scenario is important in testing the hypothesis that the method of violence in 
terrorist activity matters, specifically that gun violence perpetrated by 
terrorists is more likely to increase support for gun control than other forms 
of violence perpetrated by terrorists. It was important to include two Muslim 
treatments utilizing different weapons to determine that increased support 
for gun control was not simply an effect or a reaction to all types of 
violence, but is specifically a product of gun violence. 
 After each scenario was read, all members across groups, including 
the control group, answered three questions about requiring background 
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checks before gun ownership, their opinions on the use of metal detectors 
and other security devices, and their opinions on banning large-capacity 
magazines to determine if their opinions differed from the base opinions 
provided through the control group. The purpose of asking about a 
background check policy was to test respondents’ opinions toward a 
moderate, less extreme form of gun control. Alternatively, the ban on 
automatic weapons question was asked to test respondents’ opinions on a 
much more restrictive policy. Finally, the question on metal detectors was 
asked to determine if opinions on policies that increased security applied just 
to gun control or if it also applied to other security measures. Question one 
and three were adapted from the experiment conducted by McGinty, 
Webster, and Barry, and question two was added to assess public support for 
other security measures. Question one was asked to determine respondent’s 
support/opposition for background checks in gun sales and read as follows: 
“Would you support or oppose increasing federal funding to 
pay for a background check system before any purchase of a 
firearm?” 
Question two was asked to assess respondents’ support/opposition to a 
security measure other than gun control and read as follows:  
“Do you support the use of metal detectors and body scans in 
sports arenas and other public gathering places?” 
Question three was asked to determine respondents’ support/
opposition to a more restrictive gun regulation and read as follows:  
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“As you may know, high-capacity gun magazines or clips can 
hold many rounds of ammunition, so a shooter can fire more 
rounds without manually reloading. Would you support or 
oppose a nationwide ban on the sale of high-capacity gun 
magazines that hold more than 10 rounds of ammunition?” 
The respondents were asked to answer these questions by identifying their 
support or opposition to such measures on a scale of 1-5, 1 representing 
strongly oppose, 2 somewhat oppose, 3 neither support nor oppose, 4 
somewhat support, and 5 strongly support. This allowed us to assess the 
different levels of support for such policies. By comparing these responses 
across groups, we can analyze if the different treatments had any effects on 
the responses and can then relate them to the hypotheses.    
 Other variables, such as the demographic variables, are secondarily 
important to the interest of this experiment. While the primary concern lies 
in analyzing how terrorist activity affects public opinion on gun control 
policy, it is also of interest to analyze whether specific demographic groups 
tend to hold particular opinions about gun control in the experimental groups 
as well as in the control group. Percentage composition of each demographic 
variable is represented in Table 3. Since women, non-whites, higher-
educated and higher-income people, and Democrats tend to support higher 
levels of gun control and since men, whites, less educated and lower-income 
people, and Republicans tend to support lower levels of regulation, those 
 49
characteristics were asked to determine if those trends hold true in this 
experiment (Smith 1980). Specifically, information from the gender variable  
was used to evaluate the hypothesis that women will be more supportive of 
increased gun control than men.  
 In addition, respondents were asked to give their zip code, and we 
grouped their responses into urban and rural zip code categories based on 
population density. This was done to determine if respondents’ geographical/
regional location within the United States has an affect on their support for 
increased gun control measures in response to terrorism. Specifically, this 
Table 3   Descriptive characteristic percentages of experimental participants (N=202)
Characteristic: Percent of N: 
Gender 
       Male 
       Female
60.9% 
39.1%
Race 
       White 
       Nonwhite 
69.8% 
30.2%
Education 
       High school diploma or lower 
       Undergraduate degree or higher
72.8% 
27.2%
Income 
       Less than $50,000 
       Greater than $50,000
65.3% 
34.7%
Partisanship 
       Republican  
       Democrat
38.6% 
61.4%
Zip Code 
       Urban 
       Rural
44.1% 
55.9%
 50
information was used to evaluate the hypothesis that respondents in rural 
areas would be more opposed to stronger gun regulations and other security 
measures. To determine what population density constitutes an urban area, 
information was used from the United States Census Bureau that deemed a 
population density of 2,534.4 people per square mile to be an urban area.   
 Respondents were also asked to estimate the percentage of Christians, 
Jews, and Muslims in the US population. This was done to determine if high 
over-estimators of the Muslim population, or those with a greater fear of 
Muslims, were more likely than close-estimators, those less fearful of 
Muslims, to support gun regulation. Other experiments have utilized the 
estimation of Muslim population as a proxy for the perception of threat and 
fear (Grewal, Cebul, & Kustov 2016). Such studies have found that an 
overestimation of the Muslim population led to an increased support in 
restricting or banning Muslims from entering the country, and those who 
estimated the Muslim population more closely were as much as 20 points 
less likely to support such policies (Grewal, Cebul, & Kustov 2016). We 
applied the same method to this experiment to determine if overestimation of 
the Muslim population correlates to increased support in restrictionist 
policies on gun control. This specifically evaluates the hypothesis of 
respondents with a greater fear of Muslims being more likely than those who 
are less fearful to support increased gun control.  
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RESULTS 
 T-tests were run in order to determine if there was any significance in 
the treatments, with a significant difference in the effects at p<.05. 
Significant differences were assessed by comparing the treatments to the 
control group and then comparing the differences in the treatments to each 
other. The mean level of support for background checks, metal detectors, 
and banning automatic weapons in the control group (N = 51) can be found 
in Figure A1, Figure 2, and Figure A2 respectively.  
 The average level of support for background checks in the control 
group was a 3.8, demonstrating that the average of the respondents in the 
control group somewhat supported background checks before allowing gun 
purchases and also that the majority supported the use of background 
checks. This mean of support can be seen in Figure A1, and is based on a 
five point scale.  
 The average level of support for the use of metal detectors in the 
control group was about a 3.5, meaning the average respondents in the 
control group were between neither supporting nor opposing such use and 
somewhat supporting such use, however, this still demonstrates that the  
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majority of the respondents supported using metal detectors, even though the 
support was not as high as it was for background checks. This mean of 
support can be seen in Figure 2, again on a five point scale. 
 The average level of support for banning automatic weapons in the 
control group was about a 3.2, meaning that the average of respondents were 
between neither supporting nor opposing such a ban or somewhat supporting 
such a ban. Again, this shows that the majority of respondents in the control 
group did support banning automatic weapons, though the support was not 
as high as it was for background checks or metal detectors. This mean of 
support can be seen in Figure A2 on a five point scale. Out of all the 
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Figure 2   Mean support of the use of metal detectors across groups
respondents, 98% answered the attention check correctly.  Out of the 1
respondents who received treatment scenarios, 90% of those respondents 
answered the manipulation check correctly. 
 Effects of the treatment conditions on respondents’ support or 
opposition for the two gun control policies and one security measure relative 
to the control condition and their significance are represented in Table 4.  
The results show the effect relative to the treatment condition. Differences 
between each condition were also tested for to determine if there was any 
significant change in support in the treatment groups compared to each 
other. Generally, none of the treatments significantly increased or decreased 
respondents’ support for the gun control and security measures relative to the 
control group or compared to each treatment. The Muslim Gunman 
treatment and the Muslim Bomber treatment had no significant affect on 
respondents’ support for either increased background checks, use of metal 
detectors, or ban of automatic weapons compared to the control group.  
The White Gunman treatment, however, increased respondents’ support for 
the use of metal detectors compared to the control group, and this difference  
 After answering the demographic questions and before being presented with the 1
scenario and/or policy questions, responders were presented with an attention check to 
assess how carefully and thoroughly they were reading the questions. They were 
presented a question preceded by a paragraph of information that informed them to not 
answer the question at all in order to demonstrate that they read all of the information 
and were paying attention. Respondents that provided an answer for the question did 
not pass the attention check because they demonstrated they did not read all of the 
information presented. However, their responses were still included. 
 54
in support for use of metal detectors in the White Gunman scenario was also 
significant compared to respondents’ opinions on metal detectors in the 
Muslim Gunman Scenario. Figure 2 (shown previously) shows the 
differences in the means of the responses to the metal detector question 
across groups. These results are surprising in that there was more support for 
security measures when an in-group member perpetrated the violence 
relative to the control group, and this support was even significant compared 
to support when violence was perpetrated by an out-group member. While it 
is not contradictory across the results broadly, there being more support for 
metal detectors when an in-group member perpetrated the violence 
compared to an out-group member contradicts the hypothesis that there 
would be more support for security measures when violence is perpetrated 
by an out-group than an in-group member. However, the White Gunman 
Table 4   Effect of treatment on gun policy and security preferences
Background checks Metal detectors Automatic weapons 
ban
White gunman 0.177 0.371*** 0.384
Muslim gunman 0.197 -0.009 0.145
Muslim bomber 0.039 0.373 -0.019
N 202 202 202
* significant to control group at p<0.05 
** significant to following treatment at p<0.05 
***significant to control and following treatment at p<0.05
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scenario did not significantly increase respondents’ support for background 
checks or ban on automatic weapons relative to the control condition. 
Sub Group Effects 
 Table 5 represents the estimation of the effects of the treatment 
conditions on respondents’ support or opposition of security measures and 
their significance based on the conditional variable of Gender relative to the 
control condition. Regarding support for background checks, neither the 
White Gunman scenario, the Muslim Gunman scenario, nor the Muslim 
Bomber scenario showed a significant difference in support for background 
checks in men or women compared to the control group or compared to each 
treatment. This could be because requiring background checks is becoming a 
widely supported gun policy, therefore not causing much difference in 
opinion between men and women (Doherty et al. 2016). 
 Regarding the use of metal detectors, neither the Muslim Gunman 
scenario nor the Muslim Bomber scenario had a significant affect on support 
for the use of metal detectors in men or women compared to the control 
group or to each other. The only significant difference in support for the use 
of metal detectors compared to the control group was in the White Gunman 
scenario, with women being more likely to support such use than men. 
Figure 3 shows the differences in the means of responses of men and women 
on this policy question. However, both men and women were more likely to  
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support the use of metal detectors in the White Gunman group than in the 
Muslim gunman group. While these results support the hypothesis that 
women will be more likely to support increased security measures than men, 
it contradicts the hypothesis that there would be more support for such 
measures when out-groups perpetrate the violence. It is surprising that the 
White Gunman scenario produced such support. 
 In regard to automatic weapons, neither the White Gunman group nor 
the Muslim Bomber group had a significant affect on support for banning 
automatic weapons in men or women compared to the control group or to 
Table 5   Effect of treatment on gun policy and security preferences based on gender             
condition
Background checks Metal detectors Automatic weapons 
ban
White gunman 
       Male 
       Female
-0.058 
0.535
0.481** 
1.164***
0.180 
0.777
Muslim gunman 
       Male  
       Female
-0.231 
0.708
-0.196 
0.313
-0.525 
1.021*
Muslim bomber 
       Male 
       Female 
-0.279 
0.639
0.221 
0.688
-0.492 
0.896
N 
   Male 
   Female
202 
123 
79
202 
123 
79
202 
123 
79
* significant to control 
** significant to following treatment 
***significant to control and following treatment 
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each other. However, in the Muslim Gunman group, there was a difference 
in support between men and women, with women being significantly more 
likely then men to support such a ban compared to the control group. These 
results are shown in Figure 4. This is especially interesting because these 
results actually support all three hypotheses. There was more support for gun 
control when presented with out-group violence, there was more support 
when there was gun violence as opposed to other violence, and women were 
more likely than men to show such support. However, this difference was 
not significant between treatment groups in men or women. 
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Figure 3   Mean support of the use of metal detectors based on the 
conditional variable of gender 
 Table 6 represents the estimation of the effects of the treatment 
conditions on respondents’ support or opposition of security measures and  
their significance based on the conditional variable of Overestimation of the 
Muslim population in United States. In their opinions on increasing 
background checks, neither the White Gunman group, the Muslim Gunman 
group, nor the Muslim Bomber group showed significant differences 
between Over Estimators and Close Estimators in their opinions compared 
to the control group or compared to each treatment. Again, this could be 
because there is generally greater support for this policy proposal in the 
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Figure 4   Mean support for banning automatic weapons based on the 
conditional variable of gender 
United States. 
 In their opinions on use of metal detectors, neither the Muslim 
Gunman group nor Muslim Bomber group showed significant differences 
between Over Estimators of the Muslim population and Close Estimators in 
their opinions compared to the control group. However, there was a 
difference in opinion on support of the use of metal detectors between Over 
Estimators and Close Estimators in the White Gunman scenario, with Close 
Estimators of the Muslim population being significantly more likely to 
Table 6   Effect of treatment on gun policy and security preferences based on 
overestimation of Muslim population condition 
Background checks Metal detectors Automatic weapons 
ban
White gunman 
       Overestimate 
       Close estimate
0.080 
0.218
0.500 
0.837***
-0.170* 
0.792
Muslim gunman 
       Overestimate 
       Close estimate
0.125 
0.219
0.017 
-0.130**
-0.067 
0.225
Muslim bomber 
       Overestimate 
       Close estimate
-0.370 
0.049
0.063 
0.552
-0.169 
-0.051
N 
   Overestimate 
   Close estimate
202 
51 
151
202 
51 
151
202 
51 
151
* significant to control 
** significant to following treatment 
***significant to control and following treatment  
Overestimate - estimation was greater than the mean of 10 
Close estimate - estimation was the mean of 10 or less
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support such use than Over Estimators compared to the control group. These 
results are shown in Figure 5. 
 Additionally, there was a difference in Close Estimator’s opinions 
among groups. Close Estimators were more likely to support such use in the 
White Gunman group than in the Muslim Gunman group, and they were also 
more likely to support such use in the Muslim Gunman group than the 
Muslim Bomber group. These results are surprising for many reasons. First, 
there was more support for metal detectors when an in-group member 
perpetrated the violence, contradicting the hypothesis that there would be 
greater support when an out-group perpetrated the violence. Second, it was 
Close Estimators of the Muslim population that supported increased 
security measures, contradicting the hypothesis that Over Estimators of the 
Muslim population would be more likely to support increased security 
measures. 
 In regards to their support on banning automatic weapons, neither the 
Muslim Gunman group nor the Muslim Bomber group showed a difference 
in opinion between Over Estimators and Close Estimators compared to the 
control group or to each other. However, there was a difference in opinion in 
the White Gunman group, with Close Estimators being more willing to 
support such a ban compared to Over Estimators compared to the control 
group. Figure 6 shows these results. This again is surprising because 
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it was in-group perpetrated violence that increased support for gun control, 
contradicting the in-group/out-group hypothesis. It could be that Close 
Estimators of the Muslim population realize the low probability of actually 
being affected by a terrorist attack, and therefore see the possibility of 
violence from a much more present in-group member, a white man, as being 
more of a threat, making them more likely to support gun control when 
perpetrated by an in-group member. 
 Table 7 represents the estimation of the effects of the treatment 
conditions on respondent’s support or opposition of security measures and 
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Figure 5   Mean support of the use of metal detectors based on the 
conditional variable of overestimation of the Muslim population 
their significance based on the conditional variable of whether the 
respondents live in an Urban or Rural area. Regarding support for 
background checks, neither the White Gunman group, Muslim Gunman 
group, nor Muslim Bomber group generated any difference in support 
between Urban and Rural compared to the control group or compared to 
each variable, again possibly reflecting the general increase in support for 
such a policy in the United States. 
 In their opinions on the use of metal detectors, neither the Muslim 
Gunman nor the Muslim Bomber showed a difference in support between  
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Figure 6   Mean support for banning automatic weapons based on the 
conditional variable of overestimation of the Muslim population 
Urban and Rural compared to the control group. However, in the White 
Gunman scenario, there was a difference in support for the use of metal 
detectors between Urban and Rural, with Rural being more likely to support 
such use compared to the control group. These results are shown in Figure 7. 
However, the difference of both Urban and Rural opinions were also 
significant between the White Gunman and Muslim Gunman groups, with 
both urban respondents and rural respondents being significantly more likely 
to support the use of metal detectors in the White Gunman scenario than in 
the Muslim Gunman scenario. These results, like the other conditional  
Table 7   Effect of treatment on gun policy and security preferences based on urban/
rural condition
Background checks Metal detectors Automatic weapons 
ban
White gunman 
       Urban 
       Rural
0.301 
0.070
0.620** 
0.816***
0.047 
0.622
Muslim gunman 
       Urban 
       Rural
-0.062 
0.388
-0.064 
0.022
-0.221 
0.370
Muslim bomber 
       Urban  
       Rural
0.243 
-0.233
0.312 
0.423
-0.045 
-0.147
N 
   Urban 
   Rural
202 
89 
113
202 
89 
113
202 
89 
113
* significant to control 
** significant to following treatment 
***significant to control and following treatment 
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variable results, are surprising in that it was the White Gunman scenario that 
spurred an increase in support for greater security measures. It is also 
surprising that respondents from Rural areas were more likely to support 
metal detectors than respondents from Urban areas, especially since Urban 
areas are more likely to have places and events that would benefit from such 
security measures.  
  Regarding automatic weapons, neither the White Gunman group, 
Muslim Gunman group, nor Muslim bomber group showed any differences 
in opinion between Urban and Rural in their opinions on the ban of 
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Figure 7   Mean support of the use of metal detectors based on the 
conditional variable of urban/rural
automatic weapons compared to the control group. There was also no 
significant difference in opinion between the treatment groups. It is 
surprising that there was not more of a difference in opinion on this policy 
question between Urban and Rural respondents, mainly because such a 
stronger gun culture exists in rural areas that would oppose a ban on 
automatic weapons. It is interesting that the responses on this question 
dependent on the conditional variable of urban/rural location didn’t produce 
more polarized results.  
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DISCUSSION 
 This study has found no evidence that method of violence, specifically 
using either a gun or a bomb, has a significant impact on public support for 
increasing restrictions on gun control or other security measures. The 
scenario describing the Muslim Bomber never generated greater public 
support for background checks, metal detectors, or ban of automatic 
weapons generally or in regards to gender, overestimation, or location of 
residence. Additionally, in all cases except for one (Close Estimators being 
more like to support the use of metal detectors in the Muslim Gunman than 
Muslim Bomber scenario), there was not a significant difference in support 
for any of the measures between respondents in the Muslim Gunman group 
compared to the Muslim Bomber group. In other words, in all but one of the 
scenarios, the Muslim Gunman group never generated more support for 
security measures than the Muslim Bomber group. Because there was no 
evidence found of varying opinion across groups in support for greater 
security measures when a gun is used in violent acts or when a bomb is used, 
I failed to reject the null hypothesis that the method of violence has no affect 
on support for gun control.  
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 In addition, the perpetrator of violence, specifically an out-group 
member, does not appear to have a significant impact on public support for 
increasing gun control or increased support for other security measures. In 
fact, the White Gunman group (the in-group), generally generated more 
support in the use of metal detectors compared to the control group and 
compared to the Muslim Gunman group across treatments. This difference 
was especially evidenced in the gender conditional group, with women in 
the White Gunman group being more likely to support the use of metal 
detectors compared to the control. Additionally, both men and women in the 
White Gunman group were more likely to support such use than men and 
women in the Muslim Gunman group. This difference was also evidenced in 
the fear of Muslims conditional group. Close estimators of the Muslim 
population in the White Gunman group were more likely to support the use 
of metal detectors compared to the control group as well as compared to the 
Muslim Gunman group. Additionally, close estimators in the White Gunman 
group were also more likely to support bans on automatic weapons 
compared to the control group. In another instance, respondents in the White 
Gunman group living in rural areas were more likely to support the use of 
metal detectors compared to the control group, and respondents from both 
rural and urban areas in the White Gunman group were more likely to 
support such use than respondents from rural and urban areas in the Muslim 
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Gunman group. In fact, the Muslim Gunman treatment only generated more 
support for restrictions two times: the first is that the treatment increased 
support for background checks in females compared to the control group, 
and the second is that the treatments increased support in banning automatic 
weapons in females compared to the control group. However, these 
differences were not significant compared to the White Gunman group. This 
suggests that the perpetrator of violence, specifically and out-group member, 
does not necessarily cause an increase in support for greater security 
measures. It actually appears that the in-group member generates greater 
support for more security generally. Even though there were instances in 
which the Muslim Gunman group showed more support for background 
checks and bans on automatic weapons, this difference was not significant 
compared to the White Gunman group and was only evidenced in one of the 
conditional variables, so it cannot be generally applied. Therefore, I fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in support for gun 
control when violence is perpetrated by an out-group member or in-group 
member. 
 However, it does appear that such differences may be evidenced in 
analyzing such effects across conditional variables. The greatest of these 
effects was in the gender variable. Females were more likely to support 
background checks in the Muslim Gunman group, were more likely to 
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support the use of metal detectors in the White Gunman group, and were 
also more likely to support a ban on automatic weapons in the Muslim 
Gunman group. It is important to note that in the instances where women 
were more likely to support greater security measures, they all received the 
treatment of a gunman, not a bomber. They were more likely to support 
security measures in general when they were presented with a scenario 
involving a gunman, suggesting that the method of violence had an effect, 
and they were more likely to support gun restrictions when a terrorist 
perpetrated the violence, suggesting that an out-group member had a 
stronger impact on their opinions on gun control specifically. Therefore, 
within the conditional variable of gender, I can reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that gender does have an affect on support of gun control another 
security measures. 
 However, a different outcome was evidenced in the conditional 
variable of overestimation of the Muslim population, or fear of Muslims. 
Across all cases, those more fearful of Muslims were never more likely to 
support increased measures of security compared to the control group. In 
fact it was found that those less fearful were actually more likely to support 
the use of metal detectors and a ban on automatic weapons in the White 
Gunman group. More fearful respondents were more likely to support metal 
detectors in the White Gunman group than in the Muslim Gunman group, 
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and were also more likely to support such use in the Muslim Gunman group 
compared to the Muslim Bomber group. Since support was higher in the 
Muslim Gunman group than Bomber group, it could be suggested that in this 
condition, the method of violence does matter, with greater support for 
security being in the treatment with the use of a gun. In addition, the support 
of banning automatic weapons was greatest for respondents less fearful in 
the White Gunman group, again showing greater support for more security 
when violence is perpetrated by an in-group member as opposed to an out-
group member. In any case, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that fear of 
Muslims has no affect on support security measures because in every 
significant occurrence, it is people that are less fearful of Muslims that are 
more supportive of increased security.  
 In addition, there was generally no difference in support of increased 
security measures between urban and rural respondents. In fact, in the only 
case where there was a difference, rural respondents in the White Gunman 
group were more likely to support the use of metal detectors, and this was 
significant compared to the control group as well as the Muslim Gunman 
group. However, since there were generally no differences between urban 
and rural and because the only difference showed rural respondents more 
likely to support increased security measures, I fail to reject the null 
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hypothesis that there will be no difference in support between urban and 
rural respondents in their support for security measures. 
Design Limitations 
 I do recognize that the results of this study could be subject to several 
limitations. First and foremost, the sample size of this study was too small to 
ensure a nationally representative sample. An increased sample size would 
increase the chance of the sample being truly representative of the 
population of the United States, and could potentially lead to different 
results.  
 Another limitation of the study could be that in each scenario 
describing a terrorist attack, the perpetrator, while claiming to be a Muslim, 
was not shown to be directly affiliated with a terrorist organization. Studies 
have shown that when an attack or shooting is viewed as an isolated activity, 
support for gun control and other security measures decreases, but when an 
attack is viewed as a societal issue, support for increased security measures 
increases (Drake 2013). Since the scenarios did not mention specific terrorist 
affiliation, it could be possible that respondents viewed each described 
attack as being isolated, and therefore were not inclined to support greater 
security measures. If a terrorist organization had been mentioned as an 
affiliation, it could be that respondents would view that as more of a societal 
problem, and therefore might have been more likely to support increased 
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protection measures. This lack of mention of affiliation could be a reason for 
the outcomes of this study.  
 Additionally, in real life occurrences, shootings and terrorist attacks 
are highly emotive events. People are usually repeatedly exposed to pictures, 
testimonies, and other information about the attacks for days after such an 
occurrence takes place. This inevitably makes such situations very emotional 
for many Americans. However, in this study, respondents were given no 
additional information, pictures, or testimonies that could heighten their 
emotional sensitivity to the subject, and were also only exposed to the 
occurrence for the amount of time it took them to read the scenario. 
Research has shown that such emotions like anger and fear have an effect on 
individuals opinions on increasing security measures (Branton et al. 2011, 
Huddy 2005, Davis & Silver 2004). Since those emotive characteristics were 
not evidenced in the survey, it could be that their absence resulted in less 
supportive attitudes.  
 Additionally, the subject of gun control in America is already an 
issue in which opinion is not easily swayed (Smith 1980). Since guns 
play such a cultural role for some Americans and are such a symbol of 
violence for others, it is a difficult issue to get people to change their 
opinion on (Smith 1980, Wolpert and Gimpel 1998). As evidenced in 
the control group, the majority of Americans already support the 
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restrictive measures that were presented, and across the treatment 
groups, there was not a significant change in the level of support. This 
could suggest that gun control opinions are simply not easy to change, 
no matter who perpetrates the violence or what method they use. 
Since support for gun control is already high, changing the opinions of 
those who are opposed to gun control might be very difficult, no 
matter who is involved.  
 If I were to conduct this experiment again, there are a few things I 
would change. First, with additional resources, I would increase the sample 
size of the experiment to help ensure a more representative sample in order 
to take that limitation out of the experiment. I would also add a treatment 
that described a terrorist attack in which the terrorist was actually affiliated 
with a known terrorist organization. This would create a way to determine if 
respondents were viewing such attacks as isolated or societal and if those 
views affected their support for increased security measures. Additionally, I 
would attempt to include either a separate treatment that involves more 
emotional characteristics of an attack or simply incorporate more emotional 
characteristics in the already existing treatments. This would be an attempt 
to make the emotional effects of the treatments more like the emotional 
effects of events that happen in real life, in hopes of getting results that are 
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more representative of what people would support when they are 
emotionally involved in a terrorist attack or shooting.  
 I would also test for more differences along gender lines in how men 
and women support increased security measures differently. While the 
results were not significant enough to include in the analysis, men were 
more likely to oppose background checks, use of metal detectors, and a ban 
of automatic across treatments than women. This strongly parallels research 
that finds that men and women are different in how they react to violence 
emotionally, and that those different emotions lead to higher opposition for 
increased security measures in men and increased support for higher security 
measures in women (Lerner 2003). With a larger sample and possibly more 
emotive characteristics in the treatments, these differences might be more 
significant. 
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Figure A1   Mean support of background checks across 
groups
Figure A2   Mean support for banning automatic weapons 
across groups
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Figure A3   Mean support of background checks based 
on the conditional variable of gender
Figure A4   Mean support of background checks based 
on the conditional variable of overestimation of the 
Muslim population 
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Figure A5   Mean support of background checks based on the 
conditional variable of urban/rural
Figure A6   Mean support for banning automatic weapons based on the 
conditional variable of urban/rural
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